Add to ORKGFrom the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
We consider the relationship between neural and behavioural evidence for animal consciousness. We cr...
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) c...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish ...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
We consider the relationship between neural and behavioural evidence for animal consciousness. We cr...
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) c...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish ...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
We consider the relationship between neural and behavioural evidence for animal consciousness. We cr...